Stuart Monkton's comments on the Venezuelan referendum, posted on the Green
Left list and on the Socialist Voice list earlier today by Fred  Feldman, hit the main issues. I'll touch on three points: Chávez's assessment of the vote; some observations by Suzanne Weiss and myself from the streets of Caracas; and the issue of "defensive" struggles.

 CHÁVEZ CONCEDES - "FOR NOW" 

The referendum's outcome was the second major defeat that the  Bolivarian movement has suffered in its 15-year history. In conceding defeat,  President Hugo Chávez used the same words he spoke on admitting the failure of  the movement's initial bid for power. "As I said on February 4, 1992, we  could not do it - for now." 

In 1992, the Venezuelan masses seized on the words "for now" (por  ahora) as a commitment to fight onwards until victory was won. Today as well,  Chávez pledged to continue the struggle - in this case for the measures  contained in the constitutional reform: "I do not withdraw a single comma from  this proposal. The proposal is still on the table."  Despite what he called a "photo finish," with only 1.5% separating the  "yes" and "no" totals, he accepted "the decision taken by the people" and  thanked all those who participated in the voting-both those of the "yes" camp  and those who voted "no." 

Chávez appealed to oppositionists who had possibly been nervous  regarding the fairness of the process to take heart and be confident in  Venezuela's democratic institutions. "Let us hope they will forget forever these  leaps into the void, initiatives toward violence, and destabilization."  A 49% vote for socialism was a great step forward politically, Chávez  said. "The Bolivarian Republic will continue to gain strength. For me this is  no defeat; it is another 'for now,'" he added. "We will continue in  struggle to build the political framework permitted by the 1999 Constitution." 

AN UNEVEN BATTLE 

We talked to many of those waiting to vote yesterday at a polling  station in the January 23 district, a barrio of working people of many income  levels built on the hills in west Caracas.  One of those who intended to vote "no" stressed his opposition to the proposal in the reform for a six-hour-day. This infringed on the right  of workers to enter freely into contracts with their employers, he said.  The implication, which we heard elsewhere, was that if a worker needs to  work more than six hours, in order to earn more money, he or she should have  that right. 

We saw Chávez on TV explaining to a meeting of employers that this  reform would be introduced gradually, in consultation with employers, and in a manner that did not compromise their viability. Probably he made a  similar explanation with regard to workers, but we did not see that. And in any case, such explanations are not picked up in the mass media.  Similar distortions were circulated about many other aspects of the reform-such as the completely false claim that it challenged the right  to hold private property.

A couple of days before the vote, during a  meeting with students, Chávez talked effectively on state TV about how the government's housing program is creating private property. But it did  not seem that explanations on these and other points were been conveyed effectively to the mass of voters. 

"No" supporters that we talked to specialized in vague charges and  warnings. They claimed that the text included a commitment to communist  dictatorship, etc., but offered no specifics.  We arrived in Caracas 12 days before the vote. At that time, posters  calling for a "yes" vote were prominent all over the downtown and working-class areas (we did not visit the apartheid-like preserves of the rich).  These posters remained unchallenged-the "no" campaign conceded the streets, relying on its control of the media. 

We also noted an effort to circulate to the population the text of the reforms, which filled several dozen pages of dense legalistic prose. At first, we saw these distributions only in the city centre. Not until  the last few days did we see some "red points"-with tables, banners, and music-carrying out the distributions across the city. In the last week,  a "dual-column" version was also distributed at some points. We spent  time pouring over it, trying to grasp the changes. It was slow going. Only  in the final few days did we see several leaflets attempting to summarize the changes. 

On the whole, we did not see a concerted effort to explain why the  changes were necessary. The whole debate seemed rigged against the "yes": to  vote "yes," you had to support a very large array of proposals, which were  hard to grasp. To vote "no" or abstain, it was sufficient to object to any  one of them, or just be uneasy or uncertain. And the mass media made certain  that everyone heard lots of reasons for unease and uncertainty. 

Given the complexity of the issues, it was striking that "yes"  supporters we talked to almost invariably understood the reform well and in detail.  When we asked, "Which change is the most important," we got specific and thoughtful responses, often with mention of the paragraph number in the constitution, and often about sophisticated topics remote from the  immediate interests of the speaker.  The spirit of these responses was symbolized by a worker we met on the "January 23" voting lineup.

When we asked about the most important paragraph, he replied, "Well, I'd say article 115, and after that  articles 289, 124, and 63." (Pardon us for misremembering the numbers.)  This awareness shows the success of the broad popular discussion of the reform that took place this autumn. The discussion did not embrace  everyone, but involved a considerable part of the working masses - 80%, according  to one off-the-cuff estimate that we heard.

One acquaintance, generally critical of the Chávez leadership's limitations, argued that this  discussion was sufficient to clarify the issues for everyone and nothing more was needed. In fact, however, half of the constitutional amendments were proposed only after the popular discussion had been concluded.  We took part in a pro-reform student demonstration of 60,000-80,000 -  the largest such action so far - and a campaign windup that mobilized some 750,000, perhaps more, in downtown Caracas.

Both actions were many  times larger than anything the "no" forces managed. At both events the mood  was confident, joyous, and militant. And as Chávez points out, the vote of  4.3 million for reforms that endorsed a course toward socialism is a major achievement. We can think of no parallel where a socialist program has received such a strong endorsement in bourgeois elections which, as  Stuart points out, are heavily weighted to favour the status quo.

 Yet the vote was lost, and this is a bitter setback.  The defeat did not come as a surprise. Again and again, "yes" activists  told us that support for the reform in their milieus was noticeably less  than support for Chávez in the presidential elections last year. This trend  ate into a Bolivarian majority that even last year was not so great. The  vote for Chávez last December was 61%, and 8% of that went to a party that  has since defected to the opposition. Several state governors and other prominent figures in the Bolivarian movement have also defected.

Many Bolivarian activists told us that defeat of the reform was quite  possible.  In this context, it seemed urgent that the revolutionary forces  organize an intensive dialogue with the wing of the Bolivarian rank-and-file that  was uncertain about the reform. We expected there would be efforts at  intensive canvassing in working-class areas. We did not see this. The meeting of  the new socialist party that we attended concerned itself with the  organizing of scrutineers at polling places - a crucial and complex task - rather  than with organizing discussions with voters in its region and getting out  the pro-"yes" vote.

For the newly formed party branch we visited, just  getting the scrutineers in place and provided with logistical backup was a  major challenge, undertaken only in the last week of the campaign. (We'll  write separately on our experience with the PSUV, a very hopeful  development.)  Suzanne and I don't know enough about Venezuelan working-class  traditions to say whether such "canvassing" was appropriate. But it does appear that  in the heat of the referendum debate, a division opened up in the  Bolivarian ranks, and no way was found to bridge the gap. 

THE HAMMER OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION 

Stuart Monkton notes that the Bolivarian victories in several recent elections and confrontations took place in conditions of fierce  right-wing assault on the popular government. In this referendum, he points out,  the revolutionary forces were not on the defensive but on the  attack-seeking support for a socialist course. And it is much easier to mobilize for defense than for offense.  On a deeper level, the reform can be seen as a defensive action.

As  Chávez has explained, the socialist course is not a change from the Bolivarian movement's original goals, which included national sovereignty, a break  from neo-liberalism, endogenous development, popular democracy, and the well-being of the working masses. Socialism is the only means through  which these goals can be achieved, he says.  This fact has been made clear by the attitude of the right-wing  opposition. It claimed in the referendum campaign to be defending the 1999  Bolivarian constitution against irresponsible change. This stance was dishonest -  it opposed the 1999 constitution as well. Moreover, its actions have made  clear a determination to forcibly destroy the Bolivarian revolution root and branch and fully restore U.S. domination and oligarchic rule. In view  of Venezuela's oil wealth and world political influence, the oligarchy's masters in Washington can settle for nothing less. 

The task of international solidarity is thus more urgent than ever.  Broadly speaking, socialist revolutions succeed not merely because the masses believe socialism is a good idea, but because they become  convinced that conquering political and economic power is the only way to save themselves and society from calamity at the hands of the capitalist  rulers. The Russian October revolution, for example, was "defensive" in this  sense.  The right-wing campaign poses the danger of such a social calamity, and  its reactionary agenda was clear during the referendum campaign. Opposition supporters carried out repeated attacks on the revolutionary forces, including three wanton killings of "yes" supporters. Ominous calls were circulated for "civil insurrection." Supposedly moderate opposition  leaders did little to counter and prevent such actions.  Chávez and other government leaders called strongly for united defense against this threat. Still, these appeals related to right-wing attacks carried out by small groups, after a year in which the oligarchy and  its U.S. backers had been relatively quiescent.

The referendum results show that a segment of the Bolivarian movement is uneasy about the risks and uncertainties involved in an advance to socialism. However, given a determined and now confident right-wing movementthat aims to sweep away all their gains, the Bolivarian movement cannotstand pat.

The referendum results, while a setback, show the strength and vigor of the movement's revolutionary wing. There is every reason to hope that this wing organize itself to reunify the movement and lead its renewedadvance.